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The present research tested the hypothesis that the political structure of groups moderates the 
perceived legitimacy of collective punishment. Participants read scenarios of fi ctitious summer 
camps in which unidentifi ed members of one group aggressed members of another group. The 
political structure of both the offender and the victim groups was described as either egalitarian 
or hierarchical (defi ned with democratic or non-democratic decision-making procedures). 
Perceived legitimacy of collective punishment directed against all members of the offender 
group was assessed by measuring the acceptability of sanctions administered by an authority 
and of revenge actions infl icted by members of the victim group. Results showed that collective 
punishment was evaluated as less legitimate when the offender group was egalitarian and the 
victim group was hierarchical. Supplementary analyses showed that this effect was mediated by 
the higher value attributed to members of the offender egalitarian group when the victim group 
was hierarchical. 
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On May 12, 1996, Madeleine Albright, US 
Ambassador to the UN and future U.S. Secretary 
of State, was asked on CBS’s 60 Minutes whether 
the death of half a million Iraqi children 
resulting from the UN sanctions was a price 
worth paying. Albright replied: ‘I think this 
is a very hard choice. But the price, we think 
the price is worth it’ (cf. Herman, 2001). 
This quote illustrates a phenomenon that up 
to now has not been directly investigated by 
social psychologists: the perceived legitimacy 
of collective punishment.
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Collective punishment
We refer to collective punishment as a negative or 
harmful treatment that authorities or outgroups 
infl ict collectively upon an entire social group, 
in reaction to an offense against a formal or in-
formal rule committed by one or more group 
members. Examples of collective punishment 
abound in social life (see Heckathorn, 1988). 
In many traditional societies, for example, the 
whole family was held accountable for the crimes 
committed by family members. In modern 
societies, collective punishment is observed in 
institutions such as schools, detention facilities or 
the army, where an entire unit of pupils, inmates 
or soldiers may be punished for the offences of 
a few. By adopting international sanctions in 
reaction to misdeeds of their political leaders, 
governments punish entire nations, and thereby 
accept massive civilian suffering.
These examples raise the question of the 
legitimacy of the sanction of innocent individuals, 
central in the analysis of attitudes toward col-
lective punishment. Collective punishment may 
be intentionally directed at group members who 
are not responsible for the wrongdoing of one 
of its members (e.g. intergroup aggression), or 
infl icted unintentionally upon them as a result 
of what is usually called ‘inevitable collateral 
damage’. In both cases, however, the punisher is 
well aware and accepts that presumed innocents 
will be punished. Consequently, collective 
punishment is at odds with the principle of 
individual responsibility which lies at the heart 
of modern conceptions of the criminal justice 
system (Hart, 1968), that is, with the common 
perception that sanctions are fair when they 
are infl icted upon guilty persons and unfair 
when they punish innocents (Hafer & Bègue, 
2005; Piaget, 1932; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). In 
other words, attributed responsibility which 
is required to infl ict a legitimate punishment 
upon an individual offender is absent when a 
social group is sanctioned for the wrongdoing 
of one or several of its members. 
This lack of accountability raises the question 
of the factors that make collective punishment 
acceptable. In the literature on retributive 
justice, two major goals of punishment have 
been described which presumably also apply 
to collective punishment (Darley & Pittman, 
2003). First, if members of the offender group 
are viewed as potential future offenders, collect-
ive punishment may be perceived as a legitimate 
means for deterrence and prevention. Collective 
punishment becomes a technique of social con-
trol, since the sanctioned group is expected to 
reinforce the monitoring of the behavior of its 
members in order to avoid future sanctions. 
Collective punishment keeps deviant members 
in check and thereby promotes self-regulation 
of groups (Heckathorn, 1988, 1990). Second, 
collective punishment may also be motivated 
by a just deserts motive in which a wrongdoing 
is sanctioned as a function of the gravity of the 
offence, with the aim of restoring justice and 
enforcing violated group values and norms 
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997).
Among the many factors that may determine 
judgments of legitimacy of collective punishment, 
the extent to which individuals or groups violate 
moral values of groups is particularly important 
for our concern (Tyler & Smith, 1998). By moral 
value of the group we refer to a set of rules and 
norms which defi ne right and wrong within a 
group, for example by prescribing ‘good’ conduct 
of group members and respectful treatment of 
others. Conversely, the violation of moral values 
refers to ‘bad’ and reprehensible conduct which 
threatens group cohesion (Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003). Individuals who symbolize or contrib-
ute to maintain and enhance moral values of 
an ingroup are perceived as more deserving of 
valued resources than less prototypical group 
members (Feather, 1999; Rasinski, 1987; Wenzel, 
2002, 2004). An analogous reasoning applies 
to the allocation of negative resources such as 
punishment. Individuals breaking important 
moral values should be seen as more deserving 
of punishment than other offenders (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003). Thus, whether perceivers deem 
a sanction legitimate or not depends on the 
extent to which they consider the offence to be 
a violation of moral values of the group (Darley, 
2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Vidmar & Miller, 
1980). The breaking of group rules should 
lead to a motivation to assert the validity of 
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group values through the punishment of rule 
breakers (Vidmar, 2002). Transgression severity, 
perceived responsibility, intentionality, and 
lack of remorse should reinforce punitive at-
titudes, since deliberate wrongdoing is seen as 
diagnostic of contempt for group rules (Darley, 
2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). 
The moral value of the group provides its mem-
bers with a positive identity. We therefore assume 
that groups which are perceived as respecting 
moral principles will be attributed higher social 
value. Conversely, groups which are perceived 
as violating moral principles will be attributed 
lower social value. Accordingly, our general 
contention is that the moral value of groups 
is a key factor in the perception of legitimacy 
of collective punishment. More specifi cally, we 
wish to show that collective punishment infl icted 
upon more valued groups is perceived as less 
legitimate than punishment infl icted upon less 
valued groups, especially when the valued group 
is to be sanctioned for an offence committed 
against a less valued group.
Group value and perceived legitimacy 
of collective punishment
The present research focuses on perceived legit-
imacy of collective punishment occurring in 
the context of a confl ict between groups. Many 
factors may contribute to defi ne the moral group 
value in this context. Since collective punish-
ment is infl icted on a group rather than on an 
individual, group perception is likely to be an 
important factor in the determination of the 
group value and of the perceived legitimacy of 
collective punishment. When perceivers evaluate 
the legitimacy of collective punishment in an 
intergroup context, they are likely to rely on 
some stereotypic information regarding the 
group to be sanctioned. Characteristics of the 
offender group shape inferences about group 
members; perceived group entitativity for 
example increases the attribution of shared 
responsibility for the offender’s action (Lickel, 
Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003). 
The central research question of the present 
work concerns characteristics of these groups 
in terms of a democratic and non-democratic 
group structure. We argue that democratic and 
non-democratic political group structure is 
used by perceivers as a cue to infer group mem-
bers’ characteristics (Allison & Messick, 1987). 
While group features such as wealth and social 
class may also relate to group value and  yield 
similar effects, the present experiment focuses 
on political group structure. Prior research has 
provided support for the political inference 
hypothesis by showing that democratic and non-
democratic groups elicit particular stereotypical 
images of their members (Staerklé, 2005; 
Staerklé, Clémence, & Doise, 1998). Members 
of democratic societies are perceived as rela-
tively more autonomous, free, orderly, peaceful 
and politically involved. Conversely, members 
of non-democratic societies are associated 
with psychological weakness, obedience and 
manipulation by their leaders. They are also 
more likely to be perceived as disorderly and 
politically passive. These results suggest that 
lay perceivers easily associate the system and 
its members, by endorsing the saying that 
‘the people get the government they deserve’ 
(Staerklé et al., 1998).
An important implication of this tendency to 
infer individual characteristics on the basis of 
democratic and non-democratic group structure 
is that inferences give perceivers cues regarding 
the moral value of group members. Research 
has indeed shown that independence and indi-
vidual autonomy are culturally more valued than 
obedience and collectivism, especially in Western 
societies (e.g. Beauvois, 2005; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 
1998; Sampson, 1988). In egalitarian/democratic 
groups perceivers expect an absence of power 
relationships between members, and should 
therefore attribute higher moral value to group 
members. In hierarchical/non-democratic 
groups, however, group members are perceived as 
followers who are easily manipulated and 
interchangeable, and therefore less valued 
than ‘free’ individuals. Similarly, the decision-
making procedures themselves appear to be 
value-laden. In line with research on procedural 
justice, egalitarian/democratic decision-making 
involving the right to ‘voice’ is perceived as fairer 
and more desirable than hierarchical/non-
democratic decision-making, because all group 
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members have their say in the decision-making 
process (Folger, 1977; see also Thibaut & Walker, 
1975; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Therefore, political group structure should 
give cues regarding the legitimacy of behaviors 
performed either by or against group members. 
Recent research provided evidence for this hy-
pothesis (Falomir, Staerklé, Depuiset, & Butera, 
2005). In a fi ctitious summer camp unidentifi ed 
members of one group aggressed members of 
another group, thereby ostensibly breaking camp 
rules. The political group structure was mani-
pulated in a 2 × 2 design where the interacting 
groups were either egalitarian or hierarchical. 
Results of two experiments revealed an interaction 
effect showing that aggressions perpetrated by 
democratic groups were perceived as less illegit-
imate than aggressions perpetrated by non-
democratic groups, especially when the victims 
belonged to non-democratic groups. Indeed, 
because of the value attributed to egalitarian 
groups, aggressions against egalitarian victims 
seem to be strongly condemned independently 
of the offender group’s political structure.
The present experiment, in turn, was designed 
to examine whether political group structure acts 
as a moderator of the perceived legitimacy of 
collective punishment infl icted on the offender 
group. The same procedure as in Falomir 
et al.’s studies was used in the present study. 
Because members of egalitarian democratic 
groups are more valued than members of hier-
archical non-democratic groups, one could 
predict a victim and a perpetrator main effect 
indicating that perceived legitimacy of collective 
punishment of members of the offender group 
is lowest when this group is egalitarian and the 
victim group hierarchical and highest when 
the offender group is hierarchical and the 
victim group egalitarian. However, in line with 
fi ndings observed in previous studies (Falomir 
et al., 2005) we rather expect an interaction 
effect. Collective punishment of members of the 
offender group should be less supported when 
they are egalitarian and the offence is committed 
at the expense of a hierarchical group. Thereby, 
egalitarian groups attacking other groups are 
protected from subsequent retribution unless 
the victim group is an equally valued egalitarian 
group. 
This experiment also intends to contribute to 
the understanding of the phenomenon of col-
lective punishment by investigating the mediat-
ing role of the moral value attributed to the 
members of the offender group. We reasoned 
that collective punishment of a democratic 
group is unacceptable, to the extent that it is 
perceived as having higher moral value than a 
non-democratic group. According to our main 
prediction, this perception should appear when 
egalitarian groups commit an offence against 
a hierarchical group, but not when they attack 
another egalitarian group. In line with this 
hypothesis, we also expect that this predicted 
effect is mediated by the attribution of moral 
value. This prediction is in line with literature 
showing how negative and devalued stereotypes 
of victim groups make aggressive and hostile 
behavior toward them acceptable, for example 
in ethnic violence (Brewer, 1999; Palmer, 1998; 
Petersen, 2002; Staub, 1989).
Finally, we also want to rule out that attribution 
of responsibility of the offence to the entire social 
group, rather than to individual perpetrators’, ac-
counts for the expected effect of political group 
structure on perceived legitimacy of collective 
punishment. Therefore, a measure of perceived 
shared responsibility of group members in the 
offence was also included in the questionnaire. 
This measure will also be used to check whether 
egalitarian or hierarchical offender groups are 
perceived as being more co-responsible for the 
committed offence. 
Method
Participants
Participants were 182 psychology undergraduates 
at the University of Geneva (152 women and 
21 men; 9 persons did not report their sex). 
Their age ranged from 18 to 67 years (M = 22.59, 
SD = 5.28). All reported effects remained 
significant when controlling for the sex of 
participants.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to the one used in 
Falomir et al. (2005, Study 1). The experiment 
was carried out during a regular social psychology 
lab class, and was presented as an exercise on 
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group processes. Inspired by Sherif et al.’s work 
(1961), participants received a booklet con-
taining a scenario of a summer camp organized 
by researchers in social psychology. Respondents 
read that participants (adolescents) were split 
in two groups at the beginning of the camp, 
and that researchers observed how the groups 
spontaneously organized themselves in order to 
perform tasks such as village building, cooking 
or maintenance. Researchers concluded that two 
main types of group structure emerged during 
the camp: egalitarian and hierarchical. Concern-
ing the egalitarian groups participants learned that: 
(a) the groups collectively designated a few mem-
bers as responsible for the coordination of the 
group activities (i.e. the leaders); (b) important 
decisions were taken collectively in an assembly 
in which all group members participated; 
and (c) all members had equal decision power. 
With respect to hierarchical groups, participants 
were informed that: (a) some adolescents 
proclaimed themselves as leaders; (b) important 
decisions were taken by these leaders without 
discussion with other group members; and (c) 
leaders had more decision power than other 
members. In order to prevent perceived dif-
ferences at the level of ingroup agreement or 
the quality of the camp experience, participants 
were informed that members of both kinds of 
groups expressed equal satisfaction with their 
group and with the holiday camp in general.
Participants were then informed that the 
present study focused on an event that raised 
controversy among organizers and researchers. 
In one of the camps, there was a ‘blue’ and a 
‘red’ group, described as either egalitarian or 
hierarchical depending on the experimental 
condition.  One day, the Blues protested against 
an unfair treatment, since they considered that 
the organizers gave them less food compared 
to the Reds. The following night, during a walk 
in the forest, two angry members of the Blues 
aggressed and stole money from two members of 
the Reds. Since it was dark, the victims were un-
able to identify the two aggressors who remained 
unsanctioned. Instead, collective punishment 
of the entire blue group was now discussed. 
The participants were asked to evaluate several 
options of collective punishment for the Blues 
(see below). From now on, the Blue group will 
be referred to as the ‘offender group’ (the target 
of collective punishment) and the Red group 
as the ‘victim group’.
Independent variables
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the four conditions from the 2 (victim group: 
egalitarian vs. hierarchical) × 2 (offender group: 
egalitarian vs. hierarchical) experimental design. 
The group structure was reminded three times 
in the booklet to make sure that participants 
accurately associated each group with the 
respective decision-making structure. 
Dependent variables
All answers were given on 7-point scales (1 = not 
at all, and 7 = totally).
Manipulation checks As a manipulation check, 
participants were asked to evaluate the extent 
to which the members of both the victim and 
the offender groups were having hierarchical 
relations with their leaders, namely on three 
items: manipulated by their leaders, independent, 
and subordinate. A single score was computed, 
both for the victim group (M = 3.81, SD = 1.29, 
α = .82) and for the offender group (M = 4.04, 
SD = 1.29, α = .86), after reversing the scores 
for the ‘independent’ item.
Legitimacy of collective punishment In order 
to cover different functions of punishment and 
thus increase the validity of the analyses, three 
types of collective punishment were assessed.
The fi rst form, reparation, refers to a sanction 
infl icted by a superordinate authority in order 
to repair or compensate the harm caused by the 
offender group to the adverse group (as opposed 
to punishing the offence; Daly, 2002). Two items 
were used:  ‘To what extent the entire group to 
which the two perpetrators belong should be 
forced: (a) to restore the robbed money to the 
victims; and (b) to publicly apologize’. 
The second form of collective punishment, 
expiation, has a markedly more humiliating 
function than reparation. Two items were used: 
‘To what extent the entire group to which 
perpetrators belong should be obliged: (a) to 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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do cleaning work in the Reds’ village (i.e. the 
victim group); and (b) to pay compensation to 
all members of the Red group’.
Since these two sanctions benefi t all members 
of the victim group rather than only the victims, 
they are arbitrary and disproportionate with 
respect to the initial aggression, and incompatible 
with the principle of restorative justice.
Finally, the third form of collective punishment 
under investigation is revenge infl icted by mem-
bers of the victim group against members of 
the offender group. Revenge is a special case of 
collective punishment inasmuch as it is based 
on an informal attempt to restore justice at the 
intergroup level (Elster, 1990). Three items 
were used: ‘To what extent do you consider the 
following actions understandable: (a) aggres-
siveness in sportive competitions toward the 
members of the offender group; (b) to humiliate 
the members of the offender group; and (c) to 
insult the members of the offender group’.
The seven items assessing collective punishment 
were submitted to a principal component analysis 
(Varimax rotation) which extracted three factors 
explaining 70.06% of the variance: the fi rst one 
included the three items measuring the legit-
imacy of revenge actions (28.84% of variance 
after rotation; M = 2.36, SD = 0.99, α = .74); the 
second one comprised the two items assessing 
the legitimacy of reparation (21.66% of variance; 
M = 5.26, SD = 1.27; inter-item correlation, 
r = .40, p < .001); and the third one comprised 
the two items assessing the legitimacy of expiation 
(18.26% of variance; M = 3.05, SD = 1.09; 
inter-item correlation, r = .27, p < .001). Three 
scores were computed by averaging the items 
comprising the three factors.
These variants of collective punishment vary ac-
cording to both the reacting agent (authority vs. 
outgroup) and the function of the punishment 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003): whereas reparation is 
mainly related to a compensatory justice motive 
(i.e. compensation to the victims), expiation 
and revenge are mainly related to a retributive 
justice motive.
 
Perceived moral value of offender group Five 
characteristics attributed to members of the 
offender group were used to assess their moral 
value: moral, fair, respectful, violent and thievish. 
As an example, they were asked to indicate ‘In 
their character and their relations, to what 
extent do the members of the ‘Blue’ group 
(the offender group) appear to be moral?’ A 
composite score of perceived moral value of the 
offender group was computed by averaging the 
fi ve items (M = 3.57, SD = 0.93, α = .80), after 
reversal of the scores for violent and thievish.
Perceived responsibility of offender group One 
item assessed the shared responsibility attributed 
to the members of the offender group: ‘To what 
extent can partial responsibility for the ag-
gression be attributed to all the members of 
the offender group?’ Overall perceived shared 
responsibility for the offence was high (M = 5.37, 
SD = 1.38).
Results
Manipulation checks
Scores of hierarchical perception of victim 
and offender groups were submitted to a 2 
(victim group: egalitarian vs. hierarchical) × 2 (of-
fender group: egalitarian vs. hierarchical) × 2 
(target group: victim vs. perpetrator) mixed-model 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), performed with 
the last factor as a repeated measure. This analysis 
revealed an effect of the within-participants 
factor (F(1, 178) = 4.28, p < .04, η2 = .02). Overall, 
the members of the offender group (M = 4.04) 
were perceived as more hierarchical than 
the members of the victim group (M = 3.81). 
The within-participants factor interacted with 
the political structure of the victim group (F(1, 
178) = 105.92, p < .0001, η2 = .37), as well as with 
the offender group structure (F(1, 178) = 52.63, 
p < .001, η2 = .22). The interaction between the 
three factors was not signifi cant (F(1, 178) = .34, 
p < .57).
With respect to the perception of the offender 
group, the 2 (victim group: egalitarian vs. hier-
archical) × 2 (offender group: egalitarian vs. 
hierarchical) ANOVA revealed a signifi cant 
main effect of group structure (F(1, 178) = 56.64, 
p < .001, η2 = .24). Members of the hierarchical 
offender group were perceived as clearly more 
hierarchical (i.e. manipulated, subordinate and 
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dependent) (M = 4.64) than members of the 
egalitarian offender group (M = 3.42), thereby 
confi rming the effectiveness of the manipulation. 
The main effect of the victim group structure 
was also signifi cant (F(1, 178) = 18.48, p < .001, 
η2 = .09). Members of the offender group were 
perceived as more hierarchical when the victim 
group was egalitarian (M = 4.39) rather than 
hierarchical (M = 3.70). The two-way interaction 
was not signifi cant (F(1, 178) = .74, p < .40).
As for the victim group, the same ANOVA 
showed that members were perceived as more 
hierarchical when their group was defi ned as 
hierarchical (M = 4.59) rather than egalitar-
ian (M = 3.00) (F(1, 178) = 112.28, p < .001, 
η2 = .38), thereby confi rming the effectiveness 
of the manipulation. The victim group was also 
considered more hierarchical when the offender 
group was egalitarian (M = 4.01) rather than 
hierarchical (M = 3.62) (F(1, 178) = 6.78, p < .01, 
η2 = .03). The interaction was not signifi cant 
(F(1, 178) = .01, p < .95).
In sum, political group structure markedly 
affected the way participants perceived the rela-
tionships within the groups: when the groups 
were described in hierarchical terms, its members 
were perceived as more manipulated, submissive 
and dependent, compared to egalitarian groups. 
Consistent with fi ndings obtained by Falomir 
et al. (2005), the political structure of one group 
also infl uenced the way members of the other 
group were perceived.1
Legitimacy of collective punishment 
The 2 (offender group: egalitarian vs. hier-
archical) × 2 (victim group: egalitarian vs. 
hierarchical) multivariate analysis of variance 
MANOVA performed on the three variants 
of collective punishment as dependent meas-
ures revealed the predicted interaction (F(3, 
175) = 3.31, p < .03, η2 = .054). Means across 
conditions are presented in Table 1. Collective 
punishment received the lowest support when 
the offender group was egalitarian and the 
victim group hierarchical (M = 3.19). In order 
to test our main prediction, we performed a 
planned comparison (1, –3, 1, 1, in the order 
presented in Table 1), showing that the critical 
condition significantly differed from the 
pooled remaining three conditions (M = 3.67) 
(t(180) = 3.93, p < .001). The two remaining 
orthogonal contrasts did not signifi cantly add 
Table 1. Means of perceived legitimacy of collective punishment against the offender group as a function of 
the political structure of offender and victim groups
 Offender group
 
 Egalitarian Hierarchical
  
Victim group: Egalitarian Hierarchical Egalitarian Hierarchical
Reparation
 M 5.36a 4.83b 5.28ab 5.56a
 SD 1.19 1.46 1.32 1.02
Expiation
 M 3.33a 2.70b 3.07ab 3.12ab
 SD 1.04 1.17 1.06 1.05
Revenge
 M 2.44ab 2.12a 2.35ab 2.54b
 SD 0.93 0.98 0.96 1.10
Overall score
 M 3.71a 3.19b 3.56a 3.74a
 SD 0.73 0.81 0.68 0.59
Notes: All scales ranged from 1 not at all to 7 totally. Higher means indicate higher perceived legitimacy of 
collective punishment. Means not sharing subscripts differ at least at p < .05. Number of cases per cell from left 
to right: 44, 45, 46, 47.
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explained residual variance (F(2, 178) = 0.79, 
p < .46). Considering the overall support across 
the three types of collective punishment, our 
hypothesis was confi rmed.
More specifi cally (see Table 1), univariate 
analyses showed that the interaction between 
experimental factors is significant with re-
spect to reparation (F(1, 177) = 4.77, p < .03, 
η2 = .026), and expiation (F(1, 177) = 4.42, p < .04, 
η2 = .024), and marginally signifi cant for revenge 
(F(1, 178) = 3.02, p < .09, η2 = .017). The planned 
comparison testing for our main hypothesis was 
signifi cant for reparation (t(179) = 2.65, p < .009), 
and expiation (t(179) = 2.47, p < .02), and 
marginally signifi cant for revenge (t(180) = 1.90, 
p < .06). None of the residual tests reached the 
conventional level of signifi cance (Fs < 0.76).
Perceived moral value of offender group
Means of perceived moral value across conditions 
are presented in Table 2. The 2 × 2 ANOVA 
revealed a signifi cant main effect of the offender 
group (F(1, 178) = 14.89, p < .001, η2 = .077): the 
egal-itarian offender group was attributed higher 
moral value (M = 3.83) than the hierarchical 
offender group (M = 3.33). The analysis also 
revealed a signifi cant interaction effect (F(1, 178) 
= 13.33, p < .001, η2 = .070). The planned com-
parison testing our main prediction (1, –3, 1, 1, 
in the order presented in Table 2) showed that 
the offender egalitarian group was attributed 
higher moral value when the victim group 
was hierarchical (M = 4.14), compared to the 
pooled remaining three conditions (M = 3.39) 
(t(180) = 5.00, p < .001). Test of residual was not 
signifi cant (F(2,178) = 2.21, p < .12).
Perceived shared responsibility of the 
offender group
The 2 × 2 ANOVA showed only a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of the offender group 
structure (F(1, 176) = 2.98, p < .09): attributed 
shared responsibility tended to be lower when 
the group was egalitarian (M = 5.21) rather than 
hierarchical (M = 5.52). The interaction effect 
was not signifi cant (F(1, 176) = 2.03, p < .16). 
The planned comparison testing for the main 
prediction was not signifi cant (t(178) = 1.08, 
p < .29).
Mediation analyses
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, 
we performed a series of regression analyses 
by using the contrast relative to the predicted 
effect (1, –3, 1, 1, in the order presented in 
Table 1) as the independent variable, the three 
measures of collective punishment as dependent 
variables and attributed moral value and 
shared responsibility as mediators, considered 
separately. First, and as previously indicated, 
the contrast signifi cantly predicted reparation 
(β = –.19, p < .009), and expiation (β = –.18, 
p < .02), whereas this effect was only marginally 
signifi cant for revenge (β = –.14, p < .06). Second, 
Table 2. Means for attributed moral value and shared responsibility of members of the offender group as a 
function of the political structure of offender and victim groups
 Offender group
 
 Egalitarian Hierarchical
  
Victim group: Egalitarian Hierarchical Egalitarian Hierarchical
Moral value
 M 3.51a 4.14b 3.49 a 3.17 a
 SD 0.81 0.89 0.93 0.84
Shared responsibility
 M 5.22 5.20 5.28 5.77
 SD 1.30 1.45 1.16 0.92
Notes: All scales ranged from 1 not at all to 7 totally. Higher means indicate higher moral value and shared 
responsibility. Means not sharing subscripts differ at least at p < .001. Number of cases per cell from left to right: 
44, 45, 46, 47. 
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the contrast predicted moral value (β = .34, 
p < .001), but not shared responsibility (β = –.08, 
p < .29). Accordingly, shared responsibility did 
not constitute a reliable mediator and was not 
considered further. Third, when both moral 
value and the contrast effect were included in 
the equation, moral value signifi cantly predicted 
expiation (β = –.28, p < .001), and reparation 
(β = –.32, p < .001), but not revenge (β = .04, 
p < .62). The effect of the contrast became 
nonsignifi cant as regards expiation (β = –.08, 
p < .28) (Sobel test, z = 3.03, p < .001) and 
reparation (β = –.08, p < .26 (z = 3.25, p < .001), 
but remained marginally signifi cant as regards 
revenge (β = –.15, p < .06 (z = 0.50, p < .62). 
In sum, mediation analyses suggest that per-
ceived moral value of the group acts as a mediator 
of the effect of political group structure on 
perceived legitimacy of collective punishment 
with respect to authority-infl icted sanctions (i.e. 
expiation and reparation), but does not mediate 
the effect on intergroup revenge. Even though 
shared responsibility attributed to the members 
of the offender group was positively related to 
collective punishment (r(180) = .24, p < .001), 
this factor neither fully nor partially mediated 
the observed pattern of effects. 
Discussion
Collective punishment has only received scant 
and indirect attention at best by social psy-
chologists. It is a widely observed and fascinating 
phenomenon not only because it refers to 
many contemporary debates about the fairness 
of such techniques (e.g. in international 
relations), but also because it involves social psy-
chological mechanisms which extend a punitive 
reaction to an offence committed by a group 
member to the entire group. Collective punish-
ment therefore requires a justification to 
overcome a fundamental dilemma between 
reaching a desirable outcome through collective 
punishment and sanctioning presumably 
innocent group members.
The present research analysed the impact of 
perceptions of democratic and non-democratic 
groups on the perceived legitimacy of collective 
punishment. The main fi nding showed that 
collective punishment is the least legitimate when 
an offence has been committed by members of 
an egalitarian group at the expense of members 
of a hierarchical group, compared to the other 
three combinations of experimental groups. By 
eliciting the lowest level of reprehension, the 
condition in which egalitarian groups aggress 
hierarchical groups thus clearly stood out. This 
fi nding was consistent across three types of 
collective punishment, that is, reparation and 
expiation infl icted by a superordinate authority 
and revenge actions perpetrated by the victim 
group, even if the effect was only marginally 
signifi cant with respect to revenge.
The key to understand this fi nding is the 
result showing that members of the egalitarian 
offender group were attributed higher moral 
value than the hierarchical offender group. 
Even more importantly, participants attributed 
higher moral value to the egalitarian offender 
group when the victim group was hierarchical 
rather than egalitarian. Thus, also in terms of 
perceived moral value the condition defi ned 
with an egalitarian group attacking a hierarchical 
group stood out. Furthermore, the fi ndings 
also revealed that moral value mediated the 
impact of political organization on perceived 
legitimacy of collective punishment. The only 
exception to this pattern was found with respect 
to revenge, suggesting that perceived moral 
value is particularly important as a mediator of 
collective punishment infl icted by authorities 
rather than by victim groups. Even if unexpected, 
this fi nding may refl ect that authority-infl icted 
sanctions require a stronger moral justifi cation 
than spontaneous acts of revenge. Moreover, 
it could also be that the reversed roles of the 
antagonistic groups implied by revenge actions 
(i.e. the revenge was carried out by the victim 
group) yielded greater confusion in the scenario 
which introduced additional concerns about the 
legitimacy of this act in terms of the political 
group structure of the avenger.
Before concluding, several issues deserve our 
attention. One important question is whether 
an ingroup favoritism hypothesis derived from 
social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981) could also 
explain the observed dynamics. Indeed, it could 
be argued that participants perceive egalitarian 
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groups as ingroups and hierarchical groups 
as outgroups, and therefore be motivated to 
prevent the ingroup from negative treatment 
such as collective punishment. Nevertheless, 
we think that the present fi ndings are better 
understood in terms of a higher moral value 
attributed to egalitarian groups for three reasons. 
First, although our participants are citizens of a 
democratic country, there is no indication that 
they have perceived themselves as members of 
adolescent summer camp groups, which is the 
most salient feature in the cover story. Second, 
this alternative explanation would require that 
participants identify more with egalitarian than 
with hierarchical groups. However, our previous 
work (Falomir et al., 2005) has shown that: 
(a) identifi cation with both victim and offender 
groups was very low; (b) the greater identifi cation 
with egalitarian groups was inconsistent across 
victim and offender groups, as well as across 
studies; and (c) identifi cation did only weakly 
and inconsistently mediate the effect of group 
structure on perceived illegitimacy of the ag-
gression. In other words, the effect of the political 
structure cannot merely be reduced to a greater 
identifi cation with egalitarian groups. Third, 
the alternative explanation also requires that 
participants overall feel closer to egalitarian 
groups than to hierarchical groups. Yet, even 
if egalitarianism is a valued ideal in our society, 
hierarchical group organizations are ubiquitous 
and socially valued in many instances, for example 
in family and work groups, school and army, or 
youth organizations. Accordingly, there is no 
reason to think that our participants necessarily 
feel they are members of egalitarian groups in 
which leaders are designated collectively and 
important decisions taken collectively. In sum, 
participants are presumably well aware of the 
fact that democratic societies are made up of 
both egalitarian and hierarchical groups. As a 
consequence, the higher social, ideological and 
moral value associated to egalitarian groups 
(Beauvois, 2005) seems to be a more appro-
priate explanation of the present findings 
than ingroup favoritism. However, given that 
categorization, ingroup identification and 
moral value attribution are intrinsically related 
processes, we readily admit that the present study 
cannot provide a conclusive answer to these 
concerns. Future research should therefore 
examine whether the observed fi ndings are 
consistent across participants identifying with 
egalitarian vs. hierarchical groups.
The issue of whether the present fi ndings are 
specifi c to collective punishment or refl ect more 
general processes of punishment also needs 
to be addressed. Indeed, the main dependent 
measures referred to the entire offender group, 
without differentiating perceived legitimacy of 
collective and perpetrator punishment. This is a 
limitation of the present study, although we did 
address the dilemma of assigning punishment 
to innocents as a supplementary prediction to 
the main hypothesis concerning the higher 
value of egalitarian groups. In future studies, 
additional measures that orthogonally assess 
the punishment of individuals vs. groups, or 
punishing guilty vs. innocent group members, 
should be included in order to gain a better 
understanding of the motivations underlying 
different modalities of punishment. 
Another potential explanation for our fi nd-
ings might be differential perceptions of shared 
responsibility. The results on this measure of 
responsibility, however, were not conclusive. 
The egalitarian offender group tended to be 
perceived as less responsible for the aggression 
than the hierarchical offender group, and 
perceived shared responsibility was positively 
related to perceived legitimacy of collective 
punishment. However, shared responsibility did 
not mediate the effect of political group structure 
on perceived legitimacy of collective punishment. 
One possible explanation is that opposing pre-
dictions can be made with respect to shared 
responsibility. On the one hand, the positively 
valued egalitarian offender group should be per-
ceived as less responsible for a misdeed than the 
negatively valued hierarchical group, and the 
results showed a marginal effect in this direction. 
On the other hand, since members of egalitarian 
groups are seen as participating in group 
decision making, they may also be perceived 
as more responsible for actions performed in 
the name of the group (Staerklé et al., 1998). 
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The conflict between these two tendencies 
may have worked against the emergence of a 
clear role for shared responsibility in our study. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that the one-item 
measure used to assess shared responsibility was 
not reliable. Future research should reconsider 
the contribution of shared responsibility in the 
construction of legitimacy judgments of col-
lective punishment.
Finally, still other processes could account for 
our fi ndings. It could be argued, for instance, 
that collective punishment against egalitarian 
groups was perceived as less legitimate in the 
observed conditions because of stereotypes 
associated with members of egalitarian (e.g. 
autonomous, independent) and hierarchical 
groups (e.g. submissive, dependent; see Staerklé, 
2005). Political group structure may also shape 
perceptions of the way the group reacts to mis-
deeds perpetrated by some group members. 
The higher moral value attributed to egalitarian 
groups may for example lead perceivers to 
consider that egalitarian groups react more 
appropriately to offences by showing guilt, 
remorse and empathy toward victims. Future 
studies should examine whether factors such as 
stereotypes, perceived group entitativity (Yzerbyt, 
Judd, & Corneille, 2004) and collective guilt 
(Branscombe, 2004) affect judgments of the 
legitimacy of collective punishment. 
To sum up, the observed fi ndings extend those 
obtained by Falomir et al. (2005) on perceived 
legitimacy of intergroup aggression to the realm 
of compensatory and retributive justice (Darley & 
Pittman, 2003; Feather, 1999; Vidmar 2002). 
They provide further evidence for the basic 
assumption that the perceived value of groups, 
attributed namely as a function of their political 
structure, is a key factor in judgments of legit-
imacy of aggressive behavior carried out in 
the name of groups (Staerklé, 2005; Staerklé 
et al., 1998). The perceived moral value of 
groups drives perceptions of legitimacy of both 
aggressive conduct and collective punishment, 
an observation consistent with the idea that 
outgroup stereotypes become symbolic devices 
justifying political projects (Klein & Licata, 2003; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2000). 
Social functions of collective punishment
Given the deliberately infl icted harmful treat-
ment on innocents, collective punishment is a 
severe reaction to an offence which is in need 
of strong justifi cation. Two general motives for 
collective punishment can be identifi ed: the 
deterrence motive and the just deserts motive. 
The deterrence motive aims to prevent future 
wrongdoing. Because of the characteristics of 
the present research (e.g. the aggression was pre-
sented as an isolated and specifi cally motivated 
act and the possibility of future camps was not 
evoked), it seems diffi cult to understand the 
observed fi ndings as the consequence of such a 
motive. However, this motive deserves attention 
because collective punishment is not only a 
technique to dissuade individuals from violat-
ing group rules. It is also a technique fostering 
social control, as it implies the delegation of 
responsibility of preventing future wrongdoing 
at the level of the ingroup (Heckathorn, 1990). 
Thereby, ingroup members are expected to keep 
their potentially deviant and aggressive ingroup 
members in check. It is therefore a powerful 
technique to restore or maintain order.
With respect to the just deserts motive, two 
views may be consistent with the common fi nding 
of the primacy of this motive in punishments 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003). On the one hand, the 
group should be punished because it is to some 
extent held accountable for the offence com-
mitted by one of its members. Here, all members 
of the offender group are punished, because they 
are considered guilty by association (Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Indeed, 
the positive relationship between perceived co-
responsibility and collective punishment suggests 
that a just deserts motive underlies support for 
collective punishment. 
On the other hand, the interpretation in terms
 of a just deserts motive is also consistent 
with the symbolic function of punishments, 
destined to reassert the validity of violated 
values: innocents are punished because the 
group needs to pay for the wrongdoings 
of one of its members. Such a retributive 
motivation has been evidenced in contexts 
involving punishment of individual offenders 
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(Darley, 2002), for example concerning the 
legitimacy of severe punitive measures (Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997), racial bias in punitive 
attitudes (Green, Staerklé, & Sears, 2006), or 
the tendency to punish ingroup offenders more 
severely than outgroup offenders (Marques, 
Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). The observed fi nd-
ings suggest that such a motivation may also 
underlie the desire to punish all members of 
the offender group, especially when perceived 
moral value of the group is low. Which are the 
values and rules violated in our experimental 
context ? First, the principle of non-violence and 
fair treatment that should be observed in any 
summer camp was violated by some members 
of the offender group. Second, hierarchical 
groups may be seen as violating the values of 
equality and participation. Hence, participants 
may have accepted to punish innocents in order 
to symbolically reassert the status of these two 
values. 
These various explanations suggest that justi-
fi cation of collective punishment can be based on 
two major types of motivations. First, support for 
collective punishment may be initially motivated 
by the offence perpetrated by individual group 
members. In this case, the diffi culty of identifying 
them and the characteristics of the group justify 
the extension of the punishment to all the mem-
bers, accepted as undesirable but necessary ‘col-
lateral damage’ in order to do justice. Second, 
collective punishment may be motivated, or at 
least facilitated, by group attributes violating 
valued ideals such as equality, participation 
and democracy. In this case, the initial offence 
is a mere excuse to infl ict sanctions on the 
devalued group. This second interpretation 
would imply a deliberate willingness to punish 
members of the offender group, admittedly 
innocents. Egalitarian and democratic values 
become, paradoxically, the basic motive to 
punish innocents, provided that some triggering 
event such as the initial aggression is present. 
Future research is needed in order to clarify 
these motives.
Our fi ndings raise the question of whether 
wrongdoings committed by democratic groups 
are always more likely to be condoned than 
those committed by non-democratic groups. Our 
past (Falomir et al., 2005) and present research 
suggests that egalitarian offences are more 
acceptable when the victim group is hierarchical. 
However, severity of the punishment may also 
increase when the offender violates important 
ingroup values (Marques et al., 2001; Vidmar, 
2002). Hence, it could also be expected that 
the motivation to punish egalitarian rather than 
hierarchical rule breakers should be stronger. 
This contradiction may also apply to an inter-
national level of analysis, even if democracy is 
a complex notion that cannot be reduced to 
the way it was operationalized in the present 
research. Military interventions by democratic 
against non-democratic nations may be better 
supported if they are carried out in the name 
of the value of democracy. At the same time, 
however, democratic countries are expected to 
resolve confl icts in a more peaceful way than 
are non-democratic countries (e.g. Doyle, 1983; 
Healy, Hoffman, Beer, & Bourne, 2002). There-
fore, democratic military solutions may be 
more strongly condemned since they violate 
the principle of peaceful solutions to confl ict. 
Future research is necessary to examine such 
paradoxes in more detail, because they are 
likely to be a key factor in understanding how 
intergroup dynamics shape attitudes toward 
individual and collective punishment. 
Notes
1. This fi nding suggests that group perception 
is relative rather than absolute: given the 
aggression, group perception (both hierarchical 
and egalitarian) was polarized when the rival 
group was different rather than similar. This 
fi nding also illustrates an implicit association 
between egalitarian groups and peaceful 
solutions of confl ict, on the one hand, and 
hierarchical groups and aggressive solutions, 
on the other. Indeed, the offender group was 
perceived as more hierarchical than the victim 
group, and this effect was enhanced both 
when the offender group was described as 
hierarchical (i.e. more in line with aggressive 
solutions) and when the victim group was 
egalitarian (i.e. more in line with peaceful 
solutions). Despite these concerns, it is worth 
noting that this contrast effect is symmetric 
within independent factors (overall interactions 
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were not signifi cant) and, therefore, it cannot 
account for the main interaction hypothesis. 
Furthermore, precautionary covariance 
analyses were performed and showed that 
these group perceptions did not affect the 
perceived legitimacy of collective punishment. 
Accordingly, these results have no impact on our 
understanding of the main fi ndings.
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